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AIM GLOBALLY 
Martin S. Flaherty* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the Hong Kong judiciary dealt with a case that 
could not be more foreign nor more familiar. In HKSAR v. Ng 
Kung Siu, two dissidents were convicted of, among other things, 
desecrating the national flag in violation of local and Chinese 
law.1 The two challenged their convictions, arguing that the ban 
violated the Hong Kong Basic Law, which effectively serves as 
the city's constitution within the People's Republic of China. 
The intermediate Court of Appeal invalidated the flag desecra-
tion ban on two grounds. It held first that the Basic Law incor-
porated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
including "the right to freedom of expression."2 It then con-
cluded that this general concept protected even the defacing of 
sacred national symbols. For this proposition the court cited no 
English precedents from Hong Kong's colonial past and still less 
any Chinese principles from its uncertain present. Instead it 
staked its claim squarely and almost exclusively on Texas v. 
Iohnson3 and United States v. Eichman.4 Hong Kong's highest 
tribunal, the Court of Final Appeal, reversed.5 Yet here too, the 
* Professor, Fordham Law School; Co-Director, Joseph R. Crowley Program in 
International Human Rights; Visiting Professor, China University of Political Science 
and Law, Beijing, Spring 1999. My thanks to my fellow members of the Georgetown Bi-
ennial Discussion Group on Constitutional Law for useful comments. Special thanks to 
Mark Tushnet for his efforts organizing the discussion group over the years, for arranging 
publication of this year's session and for his patience and understanding with regard to 
this piece. My thanks as well to Curtis Bradley for reviewing an earlier draft with a criti-
cal eye. 
1. See HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu, (1999] 2 HKC 10, 18-20 (opinion of the Court of 
Appeal of Hong Kong), available at LEXIS-NEXIS, Hong Kong Cases Database, 1999-2 
HKClO. 
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General 
Assembly on Dec. 19,1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 19(2) ("ICCPR"). 
3. 491 u.s. 397 (1989). 
4. 496 u.s. 310 (1990). 
5. See HKSAR v. Ng Kung Sui, (2000]1 HKC 117 (Opinion of the Court of Final 
205 
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American cases made an appearance. In a careful concurrence, 
Justice Bokhary noted how both Supreme Court decisions had 
been decided by a single vote, in part to justify the Court of Final 
Appeal coming out the other way, but also to declare that the lo-
cal flag desecration laws "lie just within the outer limits of con-
stitutionality. "6 
Ng Kung Siu demonstrates the ongoing power of the U.S. 
legal canon abroad. This may not be a new story, but the narra-
tive is picking up speed. National and transnational courts-es-
pecially constitutional tribunals-have long invoked U.S. deci-
sions even as our judiciary seems bent on repudiating them. Just 
months before deciding the flag case, Hong Kong's first venture 
into judicial review self-consciously tracked Marbury.7 Outside 
courtrooms popular movements, too, have drawn upon U.S. sta-
ples, as witness South Africa and Eastern Europe. One need not 
be a crit to figure out that this sort of thing will only increase as 
law follows power in a world facing globalization under the aegis 
of a lone superpower. Not for nothing does China's new na-
tional contract law discard much of the German civil law tradi-
tion to borrow instead upon the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Yet Ng Kung Siu by comparison also shows the U.S. legal 
culture at its worst, and not just because Johnson and Eichman 
might well not come out the same way today. It has long been 
an international truism that the United States is exceptionally 
parochial, especially for a great power. This too is an old story, 
one with unfortunately little narrative development. In failing 
his (admittedly unfair) pop quiz on world leaders, George W. 
Bush may at the time have gained more votes than he lost. Next 
to American jurists, however, "W." seemed a cosmopolite wor-
thy of the Hong Kong bench. Those rare counsel who do cite 
non-U.S.law typically do not get very far. Here think of the Su-
Appeal of Hong Kong), available at LEXIS-NEXIS, Hong Kong Cases Database, 2000-1 
HKC117. 
6. Id. at 70 (Bokhary, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Bokhary also noted Jus-
tice Kennedy's discomfort with voting to invalidate the Texas statute. See id. at 63-64 
(Bokhary, J., concurring). He also reviewed the judicial response to flag desecration 
bans in Italy, Germany, Norway, Japan, and Portugal. See id. at 64-67. 
7. See Ng Ka Ling (an infant) v. Director of Immigration, [1999]1 HKC 291, avail-
able at LEXIS-NEXIS, Hong Kong Cases Database, 1999-2 HKC 291; Chan Kam Nga 
(an infant) v. Director of Immigration, [1999]1 HKC 347, available at LEXIS-NEXIS, 
Hong Kong Cases Database, 1999-1 HKC 347. For an account of the controversy sur-
rounding these decisions, see generally Report of the Joseph R. Crowley Program in In-
ternational Human Rights, One Country, Two Legal Systems?, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1 
(1999). 
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preme Court's almost sneering dismissal of Justice Breyer's sug-
gestion that the European Union's actual practice belied what 
the majority had said was all but a logical impossibility in a 
multi-sovereign federal system.8 With incentives like this, it is 
small wonder that the vast majority of U.S. law students gradu-
ate without having the least idea about the status of U.S. treaties 
in domestic law, the basics of a civil law system, or the applica-
bility of international custom. 
Nowhere is this problem worse than the canon, especially its 
constitutional division. U.S. casebooks and law reviews grace 
the shelves of underfunded law schools in Beijing and are re-
quested from less fortunate institutions in Bosnia, Haiti, and (in 
exile) Burma. More and more these materials cover not just 
case law, but history, economics, philosophy and the contribu-
tions of the previously voiceless. But, to a one, they have next to 
nothing to say about how the world's last superpower engages 
with the law beyond its borders. The balance of this Essay will 
first consider the scope of the problem in two essential areas: the 
constitutional law of foreign affairs and international law appli-
cable to the United States.9 It will then suggest at least certain 
essentials without which no casebook, course, or hornbook in 
U.S. constitutional law can be considered complete. On the the-
ory that we must crawl before we can run, these basics will be 
mainly but not entirely confined to old time case law. For for-
eign affairs law, the short list includes Foster v. Neilson,10 Reid v. 
Covert/1 The Paquete Habana/2 and Missouri v. Holland. 13 For 
applicable international law the candidates include UN Charter, 
the ICCPR, Soering v. United Kingdom,14 and Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala.15 
8. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997); Martin S. Flaherty, 
Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 Colo. L. 
Rev. 1277, 1288 (1999). 
9. A third vital area that should be integrated into the constitutional law canon is 
comparative approaches from other jurisdictions. See Vicki C. Jackson and Mark Tush-
net, Comparative Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 1999). 
10. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
11. 354 u.s. 1 (1957). 
12. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
13. 252 u.s. 416 (1920). 
14. 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. 439 (1989). 
15. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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I. TERRAINCOGNITA 
Wherever else they get it, law students do not encounter the 
world outside our borders through American constitutional law 
casebooks. This at any rate is how things look from a quick, un-
scientific, yet almost certainly representative survey of the free 
volumes that publishers annually add to a typical professor's 
shelf. As Louis Henkin points out, "This was not always so. In 
earlier days, the constitutional law of foreign affairs was one, 
important, integral part of constitutional debate and study."16 It 
is not so now. Specialization, national hubris, and fixation with 
the Supreme Court all have something to do with this. Regard-
less of the cause, casebooks indicate that international concerns 
are almost entirely outside the canon. With regard to constitu-
tional foreign affairs law, the coverage ranges from the pretex-
tual to the non-existent. With regard to international standards 
that bind the United States, the coverage is less than that. 
Tum first to foreign affairs law. As noted, the term as used 
here simply refers to the often complex ways in which the Con-
stitution mediates between international law and the domestic 
legal order. How are treaties made? More importantly, what is 
a self-executing vs. a non-self-executing treaty? What are reser-
vations, understandings, and declarations? Can a treaty extend 
federal power not otherwise delegated in the Constitution? Can 
a treaty abridge individual rights? "States'" rights? Not long 
ago, assembling material on these matters would have been no 
easy task. Yet readily available scholarship has filled this gap for 
at least a generation. Henkin's Foreign Affairs and the Constitu-
tion, first published in 1972, recently went into its second edition. 
Likewise, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States appeared in 1987. At nearly the same time 
any number of casebooks in public international law, interna-
tional human rights, even international business transactions also 
came out addressing some or all of these matters. Debate on 
almost all these questions, moreover, has freshly arisen as a 
"new foreign affairs law" school seeks to challenge the "ortho-
doxy" on these matters that has stood for most of the century.17 
16. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution vii (2d ed. 1996). 
17. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 1089 (1999) (introductory essay on American foreign affairs law at the end 
of the twentieth century, describing law as "more tolerant of state involvement in foreign 
affairs, more willing to impose limits on the national government's extension of power, 
and less reliant on the judiciary to maintain foreign affairs uniformity"). For efforts at 
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That said, it would be difficult to discover any of this in an 
introductory constitutional law course. Many casebooks begin 
promisingly enough, offering sections or subsections devoted in 
some way to "foreign affairs." Yet nearly all of these turn out to 
serve mainly as adjuncts to domestic concerns, typically separa-
tion of powers or federalism. Many "foreign affairs" sections ac-
cordingly spotlight material such as the United States v. Curtiss-
Wright, the War Powers Resolution, or even Youngstown Sheet 
and Tube v. Sawyer.18 While these materials deal with the do-
mestic allocation of authority to affect foreign affairs, none of 
them primarily go to the question of how foreign affairs may af-
fect domestic authority. The main exception here is the frequent 
inclusion of Missouri v. Holland, which deals with the newly 
relevant question of whether treaties can augment Congressional 
authority otherwise unavailable under domestic grants of power 
such as the Commerce Clause. As such, the case is an essential 
chesnut in any foreign affairs course.19 But even here, Missouri 
does not primarily appear to illustrate the potentially vast source 
of power that the current treaty obligations may afford the fed-
eral government. Rather, it mainly comes in either to illustrate 
the doctrines of limited or separated powers20 or, more crea-
tively, to generate questions about changing interpretive con-
both describing and forging the "new foreign affairs law," see generally Jack L. Gold-
smith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 
1396 (1999); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, g"J Mich. L. 
Rev. 390 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law 
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 
(1997). For responses, see generally David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: 
The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1075 (2000); Harold Hongju Koh,/s International Law Really State Law?, 111 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1824 (1998); Beth Stephens, The Law of our Land: Customary International Law 
as Federal Law After Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 393 (lm); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and 
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and 
Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 371 (1997). 
18. The casebook I have often used is one example: Geoffrey R. Stone, eta!., Con-
stitutional Law 473-93 (Aspen, 3d ed. 1996). See also Ronald D. Rotunda, Modern Con-
stitutional Law: Cases and Notes 223-36 (West, 5th ed. 1997). 
19. It can also be the basis of applying foreign affairs law to domestic controversies. 
See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 Const. Comm. 33 
(1997) (arguing that human rights treaties to which the United States is a member pro-
vide an independent justification for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
20. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec and Stephen B. Presser, The American Constitu-
tional Order: History, Cases, and Philosophy 497 (Anderson, 1998 ed.); Willam B. Lock-
hart, eta!., The American Constitution: Cases-Comments-Questions 113-14 (West, 8th ed. 
1996). 
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texts.21 For these reasons, it often does not appear in a separate 
"foreign affairs" section at all. 
So much for the foreign affairs matters that do filter in. 
More generally, many, if not most, casebooks effectively offer 
nothing on many, if not most, foreign affairs issues under any 
rubric. To take one example, neither current doctrine nor re-
lated scholarly discussion on whether, for example, treaties can 
trump rights shows up-or at most receives a terse note-in: The 
American Constitution, by Lockhart, et al.; American Constitu-
tional Interpretation by Murphy, Fleming and Barber, Constitu-
tional Law, by Cohen and Varat; Constitutional Law by Lively, 
Haddon, Roberts, and Weaver; Constitutional Law by Stone, 
Seidman, Sunstein and Tushnet; Constitutional Law: Themes for 
the Constitution's Third Century, by Farber, Eskridge and 
Frickey; Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking, by Brest 
and Levinson; or the American Constitutional Order by Kmiec 
and Presser. As several familiar titles may indicate, this and re-
lated omissions hardly occur because the editors have narrow or 
parochial interests. 
As for international standards themselves, the story is even 
more stark. However much they apply as the "supreme Law of 
the Land," they simply have no place in the canon. The absence 
is especially striking with regard to treaties that are broadly 
similar to the Constitution itself. Just a partial list along these 
lines includes the U.N. Charter, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),22 and the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man,23 to name a very few. 
A similar pattern is if anything more true of customary in-
ternational law. This law, too, "is part of our law,"24 though ex-
actly this proposition has come under attack by the "new foreign 
affairs" school. International custom also has strong parallels 
with domestic constitutional doctrines, most notably Justice 
Harlan's approach to substantive Due Process. Customary in-
ternational law, moreover, has furnished the rule of decision in a 
21. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, et al., American Constitutional Interpretation 206-08 
(Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1995); Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitu-
tional Decisionmaking 500 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1992). An exception is Ro-
tunda's Modern Constitutional Law, which deals with Missouri as a treaty case at 236-38 
(cited in note 18). 
22. 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976), ratified by the U.S. June 8,1992. 
23. O.A.S. Res. XXX, International Conference of American States, 9th Conf., 
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OENSer. UV/1.4 Rev. (1965). 
24. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
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number of significant Federal decisions either directly25 or indi-
rectly thanks to Congressional inco~oration of the "law of na-
tions" in the Alien Tort Claims Act. Perhaps even more impor-
tant is the principle famously articulated by Chief Justice 
Marshall that just "an act of Congress ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of notions if any other possible con-
struction remains."27 Not only does none of this appear, but here 
the omission counts double since it goes to method as well as 
substance. Casebooks give students no inkling of how to identify 
international custom. Not surprisingly, they also fail to identify 
those customary obligations that would make almost any short 
list,28 not to mention promising candidates-such as prohibition 
against the execution of minors- that would have major conse-
. us . 29 quences gtven . . practice. 
II. FOREIGN FUNDAMENTALS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ESSENTIALS 
Small wonder, then, that most American law students, law-
yers, and judges have little idea of how international law oper-
ates domestically or how the Constitution mediates the two. Just 
this term, I told my class on international human rights that, as a 
study for a conference at Georgetown, I would ask them at the 
outset a number of questions, including whether a treaty could 
trump statutes or curtail rights. When almost no one could an-
swer, I thanked them for making just the point I sought. Unfor-
tunately, this typical response also meant that the course would 
have to take a detour to cover fundamentals in foreign affairs 
law and the essentials in international standards. But it is exactly 
these materials that suggest what all American law students 
should encounter in the first place. The upper-level detour, in 
25. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980). 
26. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Kadic v. 
Karadiii:, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
27. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). For a 
reconstruction of this principle, see Curtis A Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and 
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 George-
town L.J. 479 (1997). Exactly this rule of interpretation is likely to play a significant part 
this term, when the Supreme Court considers the prolonged detention of aliens in Zad-
vydas v. Underdown, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (Oct 10, 2000) (granting petition of certiorari and 
consolidating with Reno v. Ma, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
28. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 
and§ 702 cmt. (1987). 
29. See id. 
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other words, should furnish the basis for augmenting the first-
year canon. 
This canon-within-the-canon logically begins with treaties, 
the primary source of international rules.30 Some nations, such 
as Turkey, place treaties above their own constitutions while 
others, such as the U.K., require legislative incorporation before 
they can operate domestically. The United States, of course, 
falls somewhere in between, as was first made clear in Foster v. 
Neilson, which held that U.S. treaties are ordinarily self-
executing, but may be non-self-executing depending upon the 
intent of the treatymakers. Aside from its historical importance, 
Foster meets all the classic requirements of a canonical case: it 
remains the leading precedent in the area; it generates (or is 
about to generate) controversy;31 and last but not least, it was 
written by John Marshall. As a bonus, Foster all but compels 
some consideration of the treatymaking process, including the 
Senate's current practice of limiting our treaty obligations 
through reservations, understandings, and declarations ~RUDs) 
as well as the recently hot topic of executive agreements.3 
Other treaty basics remain, together with cases that go 
along with them. The question whether treaties provide Con-
gress with an independent source of power may have seemed 
moot after the New Deal, but is newly relevant in light of United 
States v. Lopez33 and City of Boerne v. Flores. 34 For this reason, 
Missouri v. Holland merits its unusual popularity. But for this 
reason, casebooks should treat the decision for the foreign af-
fairs case that it is, which means highlighting the world of multi-
lateral treaty commitments that could give Congress potentially 
30. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(a). 
31. See generally John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self 
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 Colurn. L. Rev. 1955 (1999); Martin S. 
Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as 
"Supreme Law of the Land," 99 Colurn. L. Rev. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Laughing at Treaties, 99 Colurn. L. Rev. 2154 (1999). 
32. See generally Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 
108 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1995) (challenging customary interpretation of the Treaty 
Clause); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on 
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221 (1995) (Treaty 
Clause exclusivity as a case study for text and structural constitution/interpretation). For 
opposite takes on the use of RUDs, see Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Trea-
ties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2000) and 
Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 Am. J. lnt'l L. 341 (1995). 
33. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
34. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For the relevance of international obligations to the case, 
see Neuman, Global Dimension of RFRA at 41-54 (cited in note 19). 
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vast new sources of power, rather than as a quirky angle on do-
mestic doctrine. Enhanced treatment of Missouri necessarily 
leads to enhanced treatment of Reid v. Covert. As any capable 
student would discern, Missouri not only left open whether trea-
ties could trump the Constitution, its expansive view of treaty 
power appeared to point in that direction. Reid settled the mat-
ter in just the opposite way, holding that a treaty could not di-
minish individual rights however much it could effectively re-
duce the power of the states. 
Despite recent challenges, international custom also still 
counts as "supreme Law." In terms of human rights, this doc-
trine may well prove more important that the status of treaties. 
Even though the the U.S. has finally gotten around to ratifying 
most of the major human rights instruments, the Senate has al-
most always tacked on RUDs that downgrade the nation's obli-
gations to the level of the Constitution. Yet the sheer number of 
human rights treaties can also serve as evidence of customary in-
ternational standards that would bind the U.S. anyway, most 
provocatively, in areas such as the death penalty and affirmative 
action. For all these reasons, American lawyers in an age of 
globalization will be ill-served without at some point coming 
across The Paquete Habana, the case that most famously sets out 
the principle or Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,35 the 
modem case generally read to confirm it. The American legal 
community should also have some passing knowledge of why 
federal courts have increasingly become a preferred global fo-
rum for suits against human rights abusers from around the 
world. Here Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and Kadic v. Karadiii: are the 
best illustrations of how the Alien Tort Claims Act, first enacted 
in 1789, is now read to permit aliens to bring suit against their 
former oppressors for violations of modem international custom. 
Once these foreign affairs basics gain admittance, the rele-
vant international standards themselves must follow. Double 
back, therefore, to the subject of treaties that the Supremacy 
Clause makes federal law, that Foster does or does not make 
self-executing, and that Senate RUDs usually water down. Time 
was when, at least in a rights context, the U.S. had signed so few 
instruments that there would have been little to add. This has 
changed dramatically in just the last five years. Currently, the 
35. 376 u.s. 398 (1964). 
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U.S. has ratified no less than ten major multilateral human rights 
treaties, and has signed several more.36 
Load a canon with too much and it may explode, but at least 
a few of these instruments should be part of the inheritance of 
any world, and therefore any American, citizen. The short list 
begins with the U.N. Charter, or at least the provisions most di-
rectly related to U.S. constitutional practice. To depart from 
human rights, this would mean Chapter VII, which grants the 
Security Council the authority to order coercive measures 
against nations that threaten world peace.37 These provisions 
enhanced Presidential assertions during the Gulf War and un-
dermined them at the time of Kosovo. To return to human 
rights, likewise essential are Articles 5538 and 56,39 which obligate 
the U.S. to observe fundamental international freedoms and may 
yet mandate the enforcement of those standards in federal and 
state courts. 
These obligations, in turn, suggest at least the mention of 
subsequent treaties that define the human rights to which the 
Charter refers. Now that we have ratified it, the ICCPR should 
head the list. Other candidates include: Convention on the Pre-
36. Ratifications include: the ICCPR (cited in note 2); the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 10, 1984, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85; and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Signed but yet to be ratified instruments in-
clude: the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted by 
the General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of 
All forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 18, 
1979; 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; and the American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. See Louis Henkin and John Lawrence Hargrove, eds., Human 
Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century 334 (Amer. Society of lnt'l Law,1999). 
37. In particular, see U.N. Charter, arts. 39-41. 
38. Article 55 of the U.N. Charter states: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being what are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote: 
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development; 
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related prob-
lems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fund~en­
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religiOn. 
39. Article 56 of the U.N. Charter states: "All Members pledge themselves to take 
joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of 
the purposes set forth in Article 55." 
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vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,40 the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion,41 and Convention against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.42 One personal favor-
ite, however, is the American Declaration of the Rights and Du-
ties of Man. Unlike the Inter-American Convention or other in-
struments we have yet to ratify, the U.S. is now legally bound to 
various provisions of this originally aspirational document. In 
consequence applicants can and have brought complaints against 
the U.S. before the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights for violations of the Declaration, though the U.S. has 
never agreed to take part in the Inter-American process.43 
That leaves custom. As noted, customary international law 
will probably play at least as great a domestic role as treaties 
since Senate RUDs have gutted human rights while international 
custom continues to develop. Not unlike substantive Due Proc-
ess, figuring out acceptable ways of identifying customary inter-
national law rules is almost as important as getting to the rules 
themselves. But while an array of permissible methods mark the 
domestic process, its international counterpart has long had but 
a single, fixed, formula. As any international law primer teaches, 
a principle becomes customary only if: a) it reflects a general 
practice or commitment among the world's nations and b) has 
been undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation ( opinio juris 
sive necessitatis).44 Single and fixed, however, does not mean 
simple. A nation that engages in torture but is publically com-
mitted to opposing the practice, for example, more likely than 
not counts toward the general international practice against tor-
ture. The basic test is still sufficiently simple that no law student 
heading off into the next century should escape some encounter 
with it, however thorny its actual application can be. 
This point goes double given conflicts that appear on the 
horizon. Even a more or less fixed formula for unenumerated 
norms will generate great debate about specific content. Still, 
anyone entering an increasingly globalized legal world should at 
least be aware of the debate's terms. At one end, the Restate-
ment (Third) erred on the side of a short, readily defensible list. 
40. See supra, note 36. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. See Henkin and Hargrove, Human Rights at 549-51 (cited in note 36). 
44. See Restatement (Third)§ 102(2) (cited in note 28). 
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By its count the following acts violate the customary law of hu-
man rights: "genocide"; "slavery or the slave trade"; "the murder 
or causing the disappearance of individuals"; "torture or other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment"; "pro-
longed arbitrary detention"; "systematic racial discrimination"; 
and "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights. "45 Even under this short list, certain 
current U.S. practices may or have been called into question. 
Prolonged detention of Cuban refugees has led at least one fed-
eral court to grant a writ of habeas corpus based upon U.S. viola-
tion of international custom.46 
Some critics, however, have claimed that the short list is too 
short.47 On this view, customary international human rights 
should entail both expansive conceptions of the Restatement 
enumeration as well as others not set forth. One example of a 
more expansive conception relates to cruel or inhuman treat-
ment. Currently the Restatement declares that this principle does 
not prohibit pain and suffering arising from lawful imprisonment 
to the extent consistent with the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners. While U.S. practice may run 
into trouble enough here, a colorable argument can be made 
that the customary rule has evolved to prohibit extended impris-
onment on death row, especially in light of the European Court 
of Human Rights ruling in Soering v. United Kingdom.48 Mean-
while, examples of additional customary rights plausibly include 
a right to equal treatment with regard to religion and gender as 
well as the accepted category of race. These additions may not 
seem problematic in themselves. Then again, international 
equality standards, among other things, tend to reduce state ac-
tion barriers and increase the scope for affirmative action reme-
dies. In this light, customary equality rights, both old and new, 
would at the very least present the U.S. with interesting chal-
lenges.49 
45. Id. at § 702. 
46. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 787 (D. Kan. 1980) affirmed on oth~r 
grounds, Rodriquez-Fernandez v. Wikinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (lOth Cir. 1981). 
47. See Robert B. Lillich, "Remarks," 1985 Am. Socy. Inti. L. Proc. 84,84-86. 
48. In Soering v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
the United Kingdom would violate the European Convention on Human Rights if it ex-
tradited an applicant suspected of murder back to Virginia on the grounds that he could 
face "death row" syndrome-i.e., a prolonged, uncertain, and thus inhuman wait for his 
execution-if his trial took place in the United States. 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. 439, 439 
(1989). 
49. As any foreign affairs law specialist would recognize, the mini-canon proposed 
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CONCLUSION 
None of this is to say that a law student, professor, practi-
tioner, or judge cannot, without too much difficulty, get a 
grounding in any, all, or more of these topics. To the contrary, 
the state of international legal education in America has proba-
bly never been better than since Hamilton's day. "Global" pro-
grams, courses, journals, conferences, exchanges, and internships 
flourish. This form of flourishing, however, has taken place al-
most entirely within its own nook. With certain exceptions, it 
remains the case that the best way not to write for a law review is 
to do a piece that appears relevant to an international law re-
view. Put another way, increased interest in international law 
has yet to have much effect on the canon or canons that exist in 
related areas, and constitutional law is no exception. What 
would have to go to make room, and on what basis, is another 
matter. Still, it does not seem to be asking for too much for the 
constitutional experts of the United States at least to approach 
being as cosmopolitan as the constitutional "novices" of Hong 
Kong. 
here merely scratches the surface. With regard to case law, other leading candidates in-
clude: Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that neither domes-
tic nor international law prohibits the U.S. turning back refugees on the high seas); 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that U.S.-Mexico extradi-
tion treaty did not prohibit abduction of defendant); and Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 
429 (1968) (invalidating state statute for intruding into foreign affairs matters entrusted 
exclusively to the federal government). 
